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ABSTRACT: 
 
India’s fifteenth general election took place in five phases during April 16, 
2009 and May 13, 2009, which witnessed 59.7 percent of the 714 million 
electorate voting.  Coming 57 years after independent India voted to 
constitute its legislatures at both the levels, it indicated a number changes 
that voting behaviour has undergone in these years.  The decline of the 
one-party dominant system brought about an era of coalition politics in 
national politics. State/Regional parties gained in prominence.  This essay 
goes beyond looking at shifts and swings in voting behaviour in this 
election, contextualizing them in larger context of national politics as well 
as in the context of changes in the party system since independence.  This 
seventh general election of a new era of Indian politics that has shaped in 
the past two decades, has witnessed a reassertion and strengthening of the 
Indian National Congress in particular and national parties in general, a 
plateauing of the state/regional parties, rise and stabilising of electoral 
volatility and strengthening of the larger national party in coalition 
politics despite cohabitation problems.  The essay also contextualizes the 
elections and its results in the context of weakening of institutions in the 
country.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
General election to constitute the fifteenth Lok Sabha (the House of People, 
the directly elected house of the Indian parliament) took place in five phases 
during April 16, 2009 and May 13, 2009.  Of the 714 million electorate,2 
59.7 percent cast their votes in five phases of the election.3  This was the first 
election since the award of the Fourth Delimitation Commission that altered 
                                                 
1 Ajay K. Mehra, Ph. D, is Director (Honorary) of the Centre for Public Affairs and 
Editor of ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews in Political Science. The Author 
can be contacted at ajaykmehra@gmail.com. 
2 Larger than the European Union (25 states and 350 million voters) and the USA 
(212 million voters) combined. 
3 Given the enormity of the territory (some of them not easily accessible) and the 
size of the electorate the election was held in five phases: 16 April (17 states; 124 
constituencies), 22-23 April (13; 141), 30 April (11; 107), 7 May (8; 85), 13 May (9; 
86). http://eci.nic.in/press/current/pn020309.pdf, p. 5. 
Ajay K. Mehra  
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  
P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 6 ,  J u l y  2 0 1 0                                               2 
boundaries of 499 out of 543 Lok Sabha constituencies across twenty two 
states and two Union Territories.  The election results that surprised both the 
victor (Congress and the United Progressive Alliance) and the vanquished 
(Bharatiya Janata Party and the National Democratic Alliance), witnessed 
emergence of a more confident Congress, a confused BJP and shattering of 
the idea of a Third Front ‘n’th time and a blow to another alternative 
grouping that was attempting to emerge with a bargaining edge, with all 
options open.  This is the second time in five years that surprise element 
came in, which was well articulated by former Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee after NDA’s loss in 2004 – ‘Hum nahin janate hum kyon hare; jo 
jeete woh nahin janate woh kyon jeete’.4 
 
The surprises were in store for all – Congress, BJP, the Left Front/Third 
Front, the Fourth Front and the regional/state parties.  The Congress for the 
first time since 1991 crossed 200 mark to win 206 seats.5  The BJP, priding 
itself in its 2 to 200 march between 1984 and 1998, slumped to 116 seats, 
despite ruling six states and being part of the ruling coalition in two states.  
For the first time in a decade the two major national parties together secured 
more than 300 seats in the Lok Sabha.  Other ‘national parties’, including 
CPM (reduced to 16 from 43 in 2004) and CPI (reduced to 4 from 10 in 
2004) – who suffered losses both individually as well as as the Left Front 
coalition partners (reduced to 24 from 58 in 2004) – who secured 54 seats, 
taking the national parties in the 545 member house to 376.  The Fourth 
Front formed as a bargaining group by Lalu Yadav (Bihar) and his Rashtriya 
Janata Dal (RJD) and Mulayam Singh Yadav (Uttar Pradesh) and his 
Samajwadi Party (SP) did not do much good to either of the satraps, they 
managed only 27 seats, RJD being the worst performer. 
 
Between 1996 and 2009 the Congress has always secured more than a 
quarter of the votes polled.  Its worst during this period was 25.82 percent in 
1998, when it got 141 Lok Sabha seats.  Even when the party could win only 
114 seats in 1999, it secured 28.3 percent votes, much better than 23.75 
percent of the BJP with 182 seats.  In fact, despite its gains since 1989 and 
leading two general election wins for its alliance and peaking at 182 in 1998 
and 1999, the BJP reached/crossed 25 percent only once in 1998.  In winning 
61 seats more than 2004, the Congress bettered its voting percentage from 
26.63 percent to 28.56, which was a welcome increase for the party, though 
not a swell of support it would have expected.  In losing twenty two seats 
from 2004, BJP’s voting percentage was reduced from 22.16 to 18.81, a 
significant loss.  Looking at this electoral trend in a two decade political 
trajectory, i.e., 1991-2009, this could be construed as the Congress’s 
strength, which even at its worst (1998) had (marginally) larger vote share 
than the BJP and more than any other single party.  This is also the BJP’s 
comprehensive limitation, which at its best (1998) could only marginally 
breach a quarter of the votes polled.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 ‘We do not know why we lost; those who won do not know why they won’. 
5 Congress added another seat, taking its tally to 207, when party candidate Raj 
Babbar won from Firozabad in UP in November 2009 by-election. 
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Table 1: Congress, BJP and Regional Parties 1991-2009 
 
1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 
 
seats vote% seats vote% seats votes% seats vote% seats vote% seats vote% 
Congress 
232 36.26 140 28.8 141 25.82 114 28.3 145 26.53 206 28.55 
BJP 
120 20.11 161 20.29 182 25.59 182 23.75 138 22.16 116 18.80 
Reg. 
Parties 55 15.26 131 24.63 150 29.66 168 30.15 174 32.86 159 31.01 
Source: Compiled from Election Commission of India data and National Election Study 2009, EPW September 
26-October 2, 2009, p. 34. 
 
 
With 159 seats and 31.01 percent votes, the state parties (including 
other parties)6 barely could manage less than one-third space in India’s 
national politics; in fact in real terms they lost visible space in seats 
(29.28%) and votes.  In 2004 state and other parties had secured nearly thirty 
three percent votes and thirty two percent seats.  Taking into account the 
changing national and state party status of some of the smaller parties7 over 
the years, also taking into account the fact that many of the technically 
anointed8 national parties do not have a national reach, the space of the 
parties with national reach, if not a national party, is barely reaching half 
way mark even as Indian politics enters second decade of the new 
millennium. 
 
These realities point to an emerging political sociology of India that 
appears to be grounded in down-to-earth pragmatism of power politics rather 
than resting on an ideological platform.  As the era of coalition politics 
transits from alliance seeking by weakening (or weak) national parties from 
resurgent regional/state parties, to a resurgent national party (India’s former 
dominant party – the Indian National Congress) as the dominant partner, 
new rules of coalition game are emerging.  The new rules are also being 
influenced by generational transition in an ideologically frozen BJP, which 
promised to be a party with a difference only two decades back.  The 
                                                 
6 The parties popularly known as regional parties are called state parties by the 
Election Commission of India (ECI).  In the table we have taken a generic name for 
both state and sub-state parties. 
7 See Mehra and Sharma (2008) Tables 2 and 3. 
8 As per the ECI criteria a political party will be recognised as a State party if (a) its 
candidates have secured at least six percent of total valid votes and it has returned at 
least two members to the LA; or (b) if it wins at least three percent of the total 
number of seats in the Legislative Assembly.  A National party is recognised if (a) 
the candidates set up by it in any four or more States at the election to the Lok Sabha 
or to the Legislative Assembly concerned have secured at least six percent of total 
votes and it has returned at least four members to the Lok Sabha from any State or 
States; or (b) its candidates have been elected to the Lok Sabha from at least two 
percent of the total seats (i.e., 11 seats in the House having 543 members), and these 
candidates have been elected from at least three different States. 
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weakening of the Left Front with the CPM’s eastern citadel shaken to the 
roots, possibilities of new alliance strategies are likely to emerge.  The 
prominent regional parties too would be expected to reconfigure their 
strategies which could be tested in state polls. 
 
The fifteenth general election, which I would argue, is the seventh 
general election of a new era of Indian democracy that could be 
characterized as the bridging era signaling change while maintaining 
continuity with the dawn of democracy in India, is contextualized and 
analysed in this essay keeping in view the emerging political sociology of 
the country.  The 1989 election brought down the curtain on the one party 
dominant system and signaled a new age of coalition politics wherein parties 
of all sizes and hues had a space on the national stage and in an emerging tri-
polarism a secular alternative to the Congress was the political mantra 
acceptable across the country. 
 
The 1991 elections indicated that both the secular and non-secular 
alternatives were not yet ready to step into the shoes of the Congress.  But 
more importantly, it showed that the Congress and nation could accept and 
function with a leader outside Nehru-Gandhi family, only if the leader has 
the capacity to sustain herself/himself by politically and institutionally 
energise the party. 
 
The 1996 election and its aftermath brought out three emerging trends – 
the decline of the Congress as the single dominant party as the finality, a 
leadership crisis in the contemporary Congress without the shadow of the 
Nehru-Gandhi banyan tree,9 the impracticability of a centrist alternative due 
to power sharing difficulties and the emergence of the BJP as the second 
node of the emerging coalition politics, though the Congress was still not 
prepared for a coalition role.  The 1998 and 1999 elections did not only 
stabilize the coalition era in at the national level, they also brought the BJP 
decisively as a claimant for power at the Raisina Hill and as the second node 
of a binodal party system (Arora 2003), and given its limitations, a good 
manager of a national coalition.  The 2004 and 2009 elections indicated 
fragility of the BJP’s organisation (of the entire Sangh Parivar for that 
matter) and its brand of politics, sturdiness of the Congress as a national 
party and its strength even in a coalition era,10 relevance of national parties 
in Indian politics and limitations of regional/state/small parties. 
 
This analysis of the fifteenth general election results attempts to 
contextualize the 2009 verdict, on the one hand, with India’s larger socio-
economic contexts and on the other with the 2004 elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 It is around this time that senior Congress leader Vasant Sathe referred to crab 
mentality in Congress that was damaging the party. 
10 We are not suggesting here that the Congress is institutionally strong as compared 
to other parties.  Institutional deficit is endemic in all the Indian parties.  At a given 
time and opportunity which ever party organises itself better scores.  The politics of 
default too has determined electoral wins and losses. 
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TRENDS FROM 2004 
 
The victory of the UPA in second consecutive general election, a better 
electoral performance of the Congress, alliance pattern as well as trends in 
cohabitation of the coalition partners have continuity from the trends that 
emerged following the fourteenth general election in 2004.  In the section 
below, therefore, I am summarising my analysis of 2004 election.  This 
analysis was undertaken based on the ECI data, CSDS-Lokniti’s NES 2004 
and various reports on the election, both pre-election reporting and post-
election analysis, appearing in the print media.  I am, therefore, not 
mentioning each and every source here, which can be looked at in my article 
(Mehra 2004). 
 
The Indian National Congress, India’s ‘epochal party’,11 insisted on 
going alone till the 1999 general elections, when it slumped to its lowest 
ever tally in the Lok Sabha winning only 114 seats despite securing 4.5 
percent (28.3%) more votes than BJP (23.75%), which won 182 seats and 
secured a working majority for the National Democratic Alliance (NDA).  
Strategizing more pragmatically in 2004, the Congress conjured up a pre-
poll United Progressive Alliance (UPA), which swelled further with a post-
poll alliances and outside from the Left parties, and India’s grand old party 
returned  
 
 
Table 2: Congress and its Partners in 2004 
Lok Sabha Elections 
Party Seats Vote Share 
INC 145 26.69 
RJD 21 2.22 
DMK 16 1.82 
NCP 09 1.78 
PMK 06 0.56 
TRS 05 0.63 
JMM 05 0.48 
MDMK 04 0.43 
LJSP 04 0.72 
JKPDP 01 0.08 
RPI(A) 01 0.09 
MUL 01 0.02 
IND (INC) 01 0.07 
Total 219 35.82 
Source: McMillan (2004:AE7) 
 
 
                                                 
11 Duverger’s description of a dominant party is apt in the Indian context, ‘A party is 
dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its 
style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch.’ (Duverger 1979:308). 
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to power in a political coalition, having lost its social coalition due to 
plebiscitary politics12 pursued by Indira Gandhi – she attached primacy to 
her leadership above the social and political alliances that were the strength 
of the Congress since independence movement – as well as a multi-layered 
articulation of societal and ethnic interest in a number of political 
formations.  Winning 26.69 percent of the votes polled, the Congress was 
visibly, though not too significantly, ahead of the BJP, which secured 22.16 
percent.  Though the Congress was merely seven seats ahead of the BJP’s 
138, because its electoral support kept hovering around a quarter plus of the 
votes polled for fifteen years (see Table 1), a better poll alliance took it 
ahead of the BJP.  Obviously, when the Congress could win seven more Lok 
Sabha seats than the BJP with just 4.37 percent more votes in an alliance 
with several smaller parties in 2004 general elections, it indeed represented 
‘Multiple Transformations’ (Mehra 2004:62-71).  
 
Indeed, an ‘upsurge from below’ (Mehra 2004:62-71) or a ‘second 
democratic upsurge’ (Yadav 1999:2393-2399), is at the root of this political 
transformation.  Since this upsurge has redrawn the basis of social and 
political power in more ways than one, and more radically than ever before, 
particularly since Mandalisation of politics in India, its continuing impact 
has to be factored in.  It radicalized the OBC13 politics, reenergized the dalits 
(Pai 2007 and Mehra 2010b) caused stirrings amongst the adivasis and 
unleashed a debate on inclusive policies that never was before.   The rise of 
the BJP contextualized in this perspective, appears in social and political 
deficit – it could recruit and enlist the lower OBCs, Dalits, and the Adivasis 
with limited success, but its own social base constrained it to keep the 
political power confined with a powerful social minority, excluding the 
social group that had caused a fundamental upset in Indian Politics.14 
 
By compelling the Congress, the political party identified with the 
nationalist movement, and one which has been at the core of the party 
system in the country (Mehra 2003b:49-82), to reconcile to political 
coalition in order to come to power, after an assiduously constructed social 
coalition base of the party crumbled during the 1980s, the Elections 2004 
also signaled a definite change in the party system in India.  This brings in 
an acceptance of India’s multi-layered party systems15 which on the one 
hand compete locally and, on the other, strive to stake claims to power at the 
national stage. 
 
I also underlined the significance of alliance politics, which follows 
from the above analysis and stresses the need for a ‘right’ kind of regional 
alliance.  This has shown its significance in the 2009 elections too.  
However, the Congress strategy of simultaneously strengthening itself has 
underlined the strength of the nodal party in an alliance framework. 
 
                                                 
12 Stanley A. Kochanek describes Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s style as ‘pyramidal decision-
making structure’ and making direct plebiscitary appeals to the voters (Kochanek 
1976: 104-05).  Also see, Mehra (2003a:21-48). 
13 Other Backward Cloasses. 
14 See the special pull out supplement in The Hindu, ‘How India Voted: Verdict 
2004’, Thursday, May 20, 2004 based on the CSDS-Lokniti, NES 2004. 
15 For the rationale for using party sytems in the plural see my Introduction in 
Mehra, Khanna, Kueck (2003) 
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The overlapping of the caste and class conundrum in determining 
voting choice in India showed a peculiar arithmetic.  BJP and most of its 
allies have maintained the support of socially and economically privileged. 
43 percent of the ‘middle class’ (or the well-off) for whom ‘India Shining’ 
mattered, voted for the NDA.  However, only 31 percent of the very poor 
voted for the NDA.  The Congress alliance, on the other hand, did badly 
among the well-to-do, but better with the poor.  But in the states where the 
Left had a sway, Congress did better among the upper classes, while the poor 
and the very poor voted for the Left.  On the Caste-Community scale, 55 
percent of upper caste Hindus voted for the NDA this time; going down the 
Hindu caste order, the NDA does not fare too well.  However, the NDA got 
nearly 40 percent of the OBC votes.  The Congress, of course, has a huge 
lead among all the OBCs.  The Congress also has a huge lead among Dalits 
(35 percent votes), while the NDA could muster only 23 percent.  It must be 
noted that Dalits were a traditional constituency of the Congress, but now the 
Bahujan Samaj Party takes away nearly 30 percent of the Dalit votes, across 
the country.  Though the Congress maintains a lead among the Adivasis, but 
by consciously wooing them.  Similarly, the Congress could get 47 percent 
Muslims to vote for them, which is the highest community-wise, but the SP 
posed a challenge to it in UP since the Ayodhya controversy.  The BJP and 
the NDA did not succeed in getting substantial Muslim support in 2004 
elections.16 
 
Further, four national parties – Congress, BJP, CPM, and CPI – had 
together won 336 of the 445 (i.e. 62%) Lok Sabha seats with 56 percent of 
the votes polled.  If we look at the alliances, the three main alliances – UPA, 
NDA, and the Left – had won 479 out of 545 (i.e. 88%) seats with 80 percent 
votes polled.  Indeed, it shows that the votes were not as much fragmented as 
they were made out to be.  What has been mentioned as fractured mandate is 
actually vote-fragmentation due to fractures in the party system, or the 
fractures in political mobilization that have incapacitated parties or their 
alliances from consolidating the mandate. 
 
The puzzle of a comfortable working majority for the UPA and a clear 
verdict against the NDA despite narrow outcomes is attempted to be solved 
by reference to the mechanics of elections. 
 
Basically, what appears to be a decisive defeat for the NDA was an 
artefact of the peculiar votes-seats relationship that obtains in our 
FPTP electoral system.  This mechanical effect exaggerated a 
significant but small movement of votes into a much greater loss of 
seats for the NDA.  The NDA actually did not lose all over the 
country.  While the NDA emerged the winner in its confrontation 
with the Congress, it simply could not take on the combined might of 
the Congress’ new alliance (Yadav 2009:40). 
 
 
My analysis of 2004 also showed that the leadership question – Atal Behari 
Vajpayee vs. Ms. Sonia Gandhi (whose foreign origin was made an electoral 
issue by the BJP) – did not eventually make any impact on the outcome of 
the election.  This point was buttressed by 2009 election too, because the 
BJP not only made a strong and effective leadership, that of L.K. Advani, its 
                                                 
16 Conclusions drawn from the ECI and NES data. 
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main poll campaign, it also attacked Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as a 
weak and ineffective (nikamma) leader.  The campaign did not bear fruit; it 
perhaps boomeranged.  Obviously, more than a negative campaign against a 
leader or a party’s leadership, a positive campaign is likely to make greater 
impact.  Obviously, it has to be realistically positioned.  
 
Programmatically, the 2004 elections did not help the BJP, particularly 
its ‘India Shining’ campaign that sought to project the NDA’s success in 
economic field.  Indeed by all accounts if the NDA did not have a 
spectacular success in economic rejuvenation of the country, it did not do too 
badly either.  Whether 2009 elections helped the Congress and the UPA 
deserves an analysis.  I am saying this because from the beginning 2009 
election had been characterised as a collection of several local and state level 
elections.  It has also been referred to as an election that completely lacked a 
national level wave of any kind, though an emerging national trend became 
visible as the results trickled in.  Obviously, the micro factors that led to a 
fresh revival of the Congress fortunes at the cost of the BJP and 
state/regional parties would have to be factored in from the perspective of 
Indian democracy.  It is equally significant to analyse the loss of political 
and electoral gloss by the BJP and review its ideological and organisational 
character in that perspective.  The point made in the earlier paragraph 
regarding a realistic positioning of the positive campaign needs emphasis 
here too. 
 
 
VERDICT 2009 
 
A detailed analysis of the fifteenth general elections by (NES 2009) the 
Lokniti team of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies seek to 
demolish some ‘myths’ on which several analysts based their conclusions.17  
The myths included emerging bipolarity, decreasing role of the regional 
parties and leaders, a support for the economic reform process which would 
now continue uninterrupted, a display of political acumen and governmental 
skill by the Congress, the lack of such skills amongst the opposition, BJP 
included, and lack of an alternative model of economic development with 
the left parties. 
 
Substantively the broad conclusions drawn by the NES team based on 
their data are as follows: 
 
• The victory of the UPA and improvement in electoral performance 
of the Congress in 2009 elections could be due to a shift within the 
‘third electoral system.’18 
                                                 
17 see special issue of the Economic and Political Weekly, XLIV (39), September 26-
October 2, 2009. 
18 Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar articulated the changes in Indian politics 
since decline of the Congress as ‘Third Electoral System’ which is characterised by 
emergence of a stable coalition government at the national level.  The Congress’s 
successful entry into the coalition arena in 2004 confirmed continuance of this 
system, which began in 1998-1999.  This system is also signified by proliferation of 
political parties, a saturation of democratic upsurge, decline in electoral volatility 
due to reconfiguration of the party system, a subtle but crucial change in the creation 
and articulation of caste blocs in electoral politics and an ideological convergence. 
Yadav and Palshikar (2009b:393-429). 
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• The UPA’s ‘spectacular victory’ was tempered by a modest popular 
vote share.  Despite a modest loss of 0.13 percent in vote share, the 
combine added forty seats. 
 
• The gains of the Congress were not as evenly spread across the 
states as the loss of the BJP.  While the BJP’s losses were spread across 
the country, the Congress gained with a moderate swing in a few states 
that were accounted for also by new allies such as the Trinamool 
Congress.  A direct contest with BJP in 115 seats the Congress gained 
3.1 percentage point and the BJP lost 5-3 percentage points, which tilted 
the scale in favour of the Congress.  The distribution of the rise in 
Congress votes yielded a disproportionately large share of seats in some 
key states. 
 
• Wins and losses of the allies became a factor in election 2009 too. 
 
• A shift in the ‘third electoral system’ in terms of caste, community 
and ethnicity remained the primary building bloc of ‘political 
affiliation’, but a saturation of the politics of social identity at the macro 
level made the difference.  Also, huge constituencies of lower Other 
Backward Classes (OBCs), and ‘Maha Dalits’ remained outside the 
catchment area of the ‘caste based’ parties. 
 
• There has been decline in the very high level of electoral volatility 
resulting in a decline in ‘a habitual anti-incumbency’. 
 
• Continuing the trend from 2004, the urban-rural cleavage was 
considerably narrowed down in 2009. 
 
• The UPA has retained the edge developed in 2004 among the non-
caste Hindus, but there are no signs of further consolidation.  The 
Congress also gained among the adivasis. 
 
• There has been depolarisation of Muslim votes, but it took different 
directions in different states of the country.  The Congress, however, 
gained a modest increase of two percent of the Muslim votes. 
 
• ‘Something of an intuitive political understanding appears to have 
guided a series of small but vital decisions by the Congress leaders from 
2004 to 2009: a correct reading of the effects of economic reforms and 
the deployment of the aam adami language in 2004, a series of pro-
people legislative and policy initiatives (the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act, the Right to Information Act, the Forest 
Act, and so on), deft handling of the terrorist attack issue that did not 
disappoint the middle class; Sonia Gandhi’s decision not to become the 
prime minister, the consistent refusal of Rahul Gandhi to get involved 
in government and coalition management that was different from what 
the NDA did.’19 
                                                 
19 The parties in India since the first general election have focused on caste and 
ethnic mobilisation, what I have referred to as social coalition (Mehra 2000:77-94).  
This refers to programmatic mobilisation, which too has been a significant part of 
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• Alliances too made a significant difference. 
The conclusions relate to a broad array of factors.  The underlying argument 
indicates that the electoral changes in India appear to rest on a fickle 
fulcrum.  There are no major factors impacting the result – either change (as 
in 2004), or sustenance (as in 2009).  The voter, both rural and urban, is alive 
and aware, whatever the level of electoral participation.  Both social and 
political alignments appear to be fleeting, indicating on the one hand both 
mobilisational and choice-based uncertainties and, on the other, highly 
transitional, non-ideological and expedient alignment pattern.  Policies, 
leadership and orgnaisational issues lurk in the background, giving a mixed 
signal regarding their significance in electoral sweepstakes.  I would like to 
add a few observations emerging from the data beyond the conclusions 
drawn by the NES. 
 
The votes and seats analysis of the NES indicates how the results could 
gravitate, if not swing, in favour of one or the other party or combination.  
Seats-votes multiplier analysis of the NES gives a clear edge to the Congress 
and the UPA (Yadav 2009b: Table 3, 37).  However, despite making major 
gains from 2004 neither the Congress, nor the UPA, added much to its vote 
kitty – while the Congress added 2.02 percentage points, the UPA actually 
lost 0.13; which are explained in terms of the Congress contesting a few 
more seats, even when the alliance pattern of the UPA changed (Yadav 
2009b:33-36).  Beyond the explanation that ‘there is very little dramatic shift 
in the popular support for Congress and its allies’, the significance of both 
these developments deserves underlining.  That the Congress, which 
contested 27 seats more than 2004, and the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 
which contested 65 seats more in 2009, improved their tallies in different 
degrees in both seat share (Congress contested 440 seats, 27 more than 2004, 
winning 40 more seats; BSP contested 500 seats, 65 more than 2004, 
winning 2 more seats) and vote share (Congress improved by 2.13 percent 
and BSP by 0.84 percent), indicates that contesting more seats may not 
necessarily be the panacea for larger success or a larger national reach.  
What, however, is not clear that how the BSP’s replacing the CPM, which 
contested only 82 seats and managed 5.33 percent vote share, at number 
three by getting 6.17 percent national vote share by contesting 500 seats 
appears a ‘real’ political gain.  Of course, BSP’s contest in 500 seats 
indicates a much larger national vote share than CPM’s contest in 82 seats, 
many of which would be in its strongholds, which were contested in alliance 
with its left front partners.  The CPM lost 27 seats while the BSP gained a 
modest two seats.  Obviously, a neat conclusion is difficult to draw from 
statistical exercises in a situation of such keen political competition, which 
continues despite a relative decline in electoral volatility that marked 1996-
2004.  A more field-based qualitative as well as qualitative analyses are 
called for. 
 
The NES conclusions on vote and seat share with regard to gains and 
losses of various parties and political formations perceptively maps the 
emerging trends of their support base and strength, some of which 
nonetheless deserve further explanations and elaboration (Yadav 2009b:36-
                                                                                                                   
electoral strategies in India.  Indira Gandhi’s ‘garibi hatao’ and ‘Congress ka haath, 
aam admi kay sath’ refers to this strategy. 
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37).  All the major trends – a ‘modest gain’ for the Congress and its allies, a 
‘dramatic decline’ for the BJP and the NDA, the losses of the Left, the 
‘gains’ for the BSP – appear interlinked as part of a larger electoral and 
political trend, rather than isolated events situated in water tight 
compartments.  Congress and BSP gained from enlarged number of seats 
they contested both in terms of vote share and seats, but this strategy did not 
pay dividends for BJP and CPM (the Left Front included).  This showed that 
decline and gains, dramatic or moderate, are not only interlinked, there are 
also obvious multi-directional flows of the declines to the gains, which could 
be taken as shared, i.e., the residues from the decline of some parties do not 
have a uni-directional flow; they have been dispersed widely.  The UPA and 
the Congress, whose gains appear to be moderate in the NES, are obviously 
beneficiaries of wide dispersals and they got the critical mass right for their 
victory, aside from the fact that emerging distribution of the Congress votes 
yielded ‘a disproportionately large share of seats in some key states where it 
was pitted against the BJP or against the Left.’ (Yadav 2009b:37) 
 
Whether or not the 2009 verdict is an end to non-Congressism, or is the 
epitaph of pro-BJPism, or a freezing of, if not an end to, the politics of 
Hindutva, is still difficult to say conclusively.  In fact, given the 
unpredictable political weather of the Indian politics, where anti-incumbency 
is as (at times more) significant a factor as pro-incumbency, the electoral 
wind could blow in any direction, making decline and revival of political 
fortunes of emerging factors.  Since the ninth general elections in 1989, 
which brought a decisive end to the one-party dominant system and the 
Congress, electoral volatility has been high.  Barring 1991, when the 
Congress was able to conjure up a working majority and managed to be in 
power for a full five-year term despite uncertainties of the number game, the 
national electoral results have neither reflected pro-Congressism, nor pro-
BJPism.  Indeed, if there was anti-Congressism, it is reflected in its declining 
fortunes till 1999; 2004 showed only a partial revival, where a carefully 
constructed alliance politics that brought the BJP to power in 1998 and 1999 
failed it.  As the election clearly showed that the BJP did not lose as much as 
its alliance partners, particularly TDP and AIADMK, lost.  It also showed 
the limits of the politics of Hindutva, with or without economic reforms.  A 
further strengthening of the Congress fortunes in 2009, a reduction of the 
BJP’s seats and a political assertion of the Congress vis-à-vis the regional 
parties is current reality, but not necessarily a trend, which would unfold 
gradually as post-general election politics unfolds.  Of particular significance 
would be the Congress’s strategies in states such as UP, Bihar, MP, Gujarat, 
Karnataka, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh, and the counter politics by BSP, 
JD(U), BJP, Shiromani Akali Dal and TDP to retain or recapture their hard 
earned political turf. 
 
In fact, both the main national parties – Congress and BJP – have 
imperatives to strengthen their organisations individually.  The Congress has 
greater compulsions and rationale to do so as it is the only party with a 
nation-wide organisation and support base, hence it is the only national party 
beyond the techno-administrative definitions.  Congress has a serious 
leadership deficit in mnay key states such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, 
Jharkhand, Karnataka, MP, Orissa, UP, Uttarakhand, West Bengal, and so 
on.  Both ambitions and image/agenda clashes with alliance partners on the 
one hand and the party’s own political compulsions on the other also 
continue to remain significant factors.  The BJP has neither ever held power 
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at the national level on its own, nor does it have the capacity to win absolute 
majority in the Lok Sabha without state-wise alliances.  It must be stressed 
that domain clashes are prevalent and they would continue to be present in 
both the cases.  The BJP is more accommodating.  Obviously, state elections 
between the fifteenth and the sixteenth general elections (when ever it is 
held) would hold the key to a more uniform trend, if at all that emerges.  
Aside from swings in the voter inclination, a lot would, therefore, depend on 
how parties and alliances conduct themselves.  Otherwise we will keep 
drawing same meaning out of continuing political madness. 
 
Naturally, the emerging trends with regard to national parties and 
smaller parties, variously addressed as regional parties or state parties, too 
deserve an analysis.  Table 3 clearly shows the fickleness of the ECI criteria.  
Over the past seven general elections in two decades, twelve parties have 
been classified as national parties.  Four of them do not exist any more.  
Only one – BSP – has displayed a consistency in retaining its status as a 
national party since 1991.  The CPI is reportedly in the process of losing its 
national status, though there is no formal ECI notification on it as yet and the 
RJD got a massive drubbing soon after being notified as a national party in 
the 2009 elections.  It has requested the ECI to put on hold a decision on its 
national status till the Bihar State Legislative Assembly election in 2011.  
Only four parties – Congress, BJP, CPM and CPI – have consistently 
remained, and perhaps continue to be, national parties both electorally and in 
their national organisational reach in the past two decades, i.e. since the 
evolution of the post-Congress polity.  Except for the current weakening of 
BJP (which could be transitional) and the Left (about which a definitive 
formulation is difficult to make for the time being), only emerging trend is 
the sustenance of the BSP’s national status.  None of the rest of the national 
parties in the list has a national reach.  Most of them, such as BSP, NCP and 
RJD, are one  state parties  with some  presence a few other states.  
Obviously, after two 
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Table 3: National Parties in the Lok Sabha since 198920 
 
S.No. Parties21 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 
1 INC@µψπж♣§ 197 232 140 141 114 145 206 
2 BJP@µψπж♣§ 85 120 161 182 182 138 116 
3 JD/JD(U)@µψπж 143 59 46 6 2122 8 20 
4 CPM@µψπж♣§ 33 35 32 32 33 43 16 
5 CPI@µψπж♣§ 12 14 12 9 4 10 4 
6 BSPπж♣§ 3 2 11 5 14 19 21 
7 NCP♣§ - - - - 12 9 9 
8 RJD§ - - - 17 7 24 4 
9 SAPψπ - - 8 12 - - - 
10 JD(S)µж - - - - 1 3 - 
11 JNP@µψ - 5 - 1 - 1 - 
12 ICS(SCS)@µ 1 1 - - - - - 
         Source: compiled from the ECI data. 
 
decades of evolution of the post-Congress Indian polity and at a juncture 
when the Congress is making intense efforts to revive itself, though it has 
not given up its dynastic plank, the BJP is finding hard to rediscover itself, 
and the Left appears at a loss with itself and the emerging times, it is 
important to begin a nuanced analysis to delineate ‘national parties’.  
Electorally, the four common national parties in the past two decades have 
secured 63 percent seats with 54.13 percent votes and seven national parties 
in 2009 have secured 69.24 percent seats with 63.35 percent votes (Table 4). 
 
 
Table 4: National & State Parties in the Lok Sabha 1989-2004 
Year 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009 
No. of Contesting National 
Parties 8 9 8 7 7 6 7 
No. of Common National 
Parties 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
No. of Seats (%age of votes) 
won by the National Parties 
471 
(79.34
) 
466 
(80.65
) 
403 
(69.08
) 
387 
(67.98
) 
369 
(67.11
) 
364 
(62.89
) 
376 
(63.58
) 
                                                 
20 @National Parties as per the ECI in 1989. 
      µNational Parties as per the ECI in 1991. 
      ψNational Parties as per the ECI in 1996. 
      πNational Parties as per the ECI in 1998. 
      жNational Parties as per the ECI in 1999. 
      ♣National Parties as per the ECI in 2004. 
      §National Party as per the ECI in 2009. 
21 INC (Indian National Congress), BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), JD/JD(U) (Janata 
Dal-United), CPM (Communist Party of India-Marxist), CPI (Communist Party of 
India), BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party), NCP (Nationalist Congress Party), RJD 
(Rashtriya Janata Dal), SAP (Samata Party), JD(S) (Janata Dal-Secular), JNP 
(Janata Party), ICS(SCS) {Indira Congress (Socialist-Sarat Chandra Sinha)}. 
22 Of these seats, the JD (U) got 21 seats, while J D (S) got just one. 
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No. of Seats (%age of votes) 
won by all the State Parties* 
46 
(15.41
) 
54 
(15.19
) 
131 
(24.63
) 
150 
(29.66
) 
168 
(30.15
) 
174 
(32.86
) 
159* 
(31.01
) 
*Recognised and registered (unrecognised) State Parties. 
Source:  Compiled from the ECI data.  
 
State/Regional parties have plateaued nearly at one-third mandate since 
1999, with a slight, but visible, decline in 2009 (Mehra and Sharma 2009).  
As indicated at the outset, the regional/state parties have secured 159 
(29.28%) seats and 31.01 percent votes 
 
 
Table 5: Vote share for National and other parties since 1952 
 
Year Vote Share Seat Share 
 All 
National 
Parties 
State 
Parties 
Other 
Regtd. 
Parties 
Total - 
state & 
other 
parties 
Total 
seats 
All Na- 
ional 
parties 
State 
part-
ies 
Other 
regtd. 
parties 
Total -  
state & 
other 
parties 
% of seats 
with state 
& other 
parties 
1952 76.00 8.10 -- 8.10 489 418 34 -- 34 6.95 
1957 73.08 7.60 -- 7.60 494 421 31 -- 31 6.28 
1962 78.50 9.28 1.17 10.45 494 440 28 6 34 6.88 
1967 76.13 9.69 0.39 10.08 520 440 43 2 45 8.65 
1971 77.84 10.17 3.62 13.79 518 451 40 13 53 10.23 
1977 84.67 8.80 1.03 9.83 542 481 49 3 52 9.59 
1980 85.07 7.69 0.81 8.50 529 485 34 1 35 6.62 
1984 79.80 11.56 0.72 12.28 514 451 58 0 58 12.86 
1989 79.34 9.28 6.13 15.41 529 471 27 19 46 8.70 
1991 80.58 13.08 2.08 15.26 534 478 51 4 55 10.30 
1996 69.08 22.43 2.20 24.63 543 403 129 2 131 24.13 
1998 67.98 18.79 10.87 29.66 543 387 101 49 150 27.62 
1999 67.11 26.93 3.22 30.15 543 369 158 10 168 30.94 
2004 62.89 28.90 3.96 32.86 543 364 159 15 174 32.04 
2009 63.58 -- -- 31.01 543 376 -- -- 159 29.28 
Source: Data Unit, Lokniti-CSDS, Delhi and 2009 election data. 
 
in the fifteenth general elections.  It confirms the trend of the past.  Table 4 
indicates that the regional parties have got 15 seats fewer than 2004.  The 
vote percentage too shows a 0.15 percentage point decline.  The data on vote 
share and seat share since 1996 nonetheless shows a consistent 
correspondence between the two.  Clearly, the vote share of the state and 
other parties has reached a critical level, which helps them with 
corresponding share in the Lok Sabha seats.  There is indeed a plateauing of 
the vote share since 1998, 0.15 percentage point decline between 2004 and 
2009, resulting in 2.76 percentage point decline in seat share, but it is still 
too early to predict a decline of their electoral and political strength (see 
Table 5).  While the BJP is attempting to rediscover itself since the change 
of guard in December 2009 to the next generation of leaders, the resurgence 
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of the Congress in the past few years could also determine the fate of 
regionalisation of the party system.23 
 
The significance of the 2009 elections should also be judged in terms of 
the emerging trends in alliance politics, particularly from the perspective of 
the politics of cohabitation.24  Importantly, barring 1991, the results of six 
elections (1989, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009) have either led to, or 
have been the outcomes of alliance politics – pre-poll, post-poll or both.  The 
emerging political and electoral trends shaping the fifteenth general election 
and following it would have to be put in the context of the nature of the 
politics of coalition and cohabitation.  The Congress would definitely need 
its allies, both ‘national’ and regional to run the UPA.  Given the fact that 
UPA has not really crossed 50 percent mark, Congress also has to keep 
parties that could give it outside support from issue to issue, such as RJD, SP 
and BSP.  But its stakes in Bihar and UP is likely to create issues of 
cohabitation from time to time.  Further, with 206 seats in the Lok Sabha and 
21 from UP, the party appears in high spirits over its recent ascendance in 
the state politics.  During UPA-I Congress was accused by some of its 
smaller allies of cornering most of the plum positions, the situation does not 
have changed substantially.  The Congress appears more confident in doing 
so in the UPA-II, it could be more belligerent towards its alliance partners. 
However, in larger political terms the role of the regional parties could come 
under a close watch.  In the ruling alliance, DMK, AITC, NCP and so on, 
parties either with substantial presence or having a heavy-weight leader (or 
both), would matter.  The Congress appears to sit comfortably after giving 
them some key portfolios, with the spirit of non-interference beyond larger 
policy guidelines.  The parties supporting the UPA from outside appear to be 
developing irrelevance, but also find themselves short of political options – 
SP in UP is in such a situation.  In a larger perspective, the Dravidian parties 
(DMK and AIDMK), SAD, JD (U), and a few others like the Shiv Sena 
could remain relevant, but most others would face political irrelevance; they 
may still exist with uncertain future.  While parties like the Shiv Sena could 
become aggressive, the proliferation of parties could temporarily be halted. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 A recent analysis shows that of 992 Legislative Assembly seats in various states 
that went to polls in 2009, Congress won 360 seats and BJP 79.  Further, of the 
seven states that went to polls in 2009, the Congress lost two – Orissa and Sikkim, 
which have not been the party stronghold for quite a while.  The party won a second 
term each in Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh and Haryana and pulled off a third 
consecutive victory in Maharashtra.  It also improved its position in Jharkhand, the 
state where the party had been at the centre of murky politics since its inception.  
The Congress-led alliance won 440 seats in these state elections and the BJP alliance 
125.  Other set of national parties, mainly consisting of the Left do not have much 
sway except in their stronghold in three states – West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura.  
Obviously, regional parties, some of which are part of either the Congress or the BJP 
alliance, hold sway in state politics.  (Subrahmanyam 2010:10).  
24 The concept of cohabitation has been developed by the Centre for Public Affairs 
(New Delhi) research collective that attempted, in collaboration with the Heinrich 
Böll Stiftung, analyses of factors that were likely to affect the fifteenth general 
elections.  For details on how the concept has been used in an analysis of coalition 
politics see Kailash (2010:86-113). 
Ajay K. Mehra  
 
H E I D E L B E R G  P A P E R S  I N  S O U T H  A S I A N  A N D  C O M P A R A T I V E  
P O L I T I C S  
h t t p : / / h p s a c p . u n i - h d . d e /  
W o r k i n g  P a p e r  N o .  5 6 ,  J u l y  2 0 1 0                                               16 
Table 6: Tussles in Alliance Politics 2004-2009 
 
STATE TUSSLE 
Bihar JD (U)-BJP, Cong-RJD/LJP 
Jammu & Kashmir Cong-PDP, Cong-NC 
Jharkhand BJP-JMM, Cong-JMM 
Karnataka JD (S)-any alliance party 
Kerala Cong.-NCP (emerging) 
Maharashtra Cong.-NCP, BJP-SS, SS-MNS 
Meghalaya Cong.-NCP 
Odisha BJP-BJD 
Uttar Pradesh Cong-SP/BSP 
West Bengal BJP-AITC, Cong.-AITC 
 
 
Table 6 gives a glimpse of major cohabitation tussles in alliance politics in 
India that have emerged since the 2004 elections, but continue to persist in 
accentuated fashion since even after the fifteenth general election.  
Obviously, the problems continue not merely with Congress and its partners, 
but most major parties are obviously to be part of it.  The tussle between 
Janata Dal (U) and BJP in Bihar is an old one that has got accentuated 
recently.  In the 2009 elections, Congress’ alliance partners RJD and Lok 
Janashakti Party decided to keep their stakes in the UPA while exploring 
new frontiers as the fourth front.  The Congress-People’s Democratic Party 
partnership in J&K was as uneasy as the Congress-National Conference 
partnership is now.  Jharkhand Mukti Morcha has maintained its reputation 
as a strange bedfellow with both Congress and BJP.  Nationalist Congress 
Party maintains its uneasy partnership with the Congress in Maharashtra, 
Meghalaya and now has opened a new front in Kerala.  BJP-Shiv Sena 
partnership in Maharashtra too has had its moments of tension.  Orissa has 
witnessed political drama between the Biju Janata Dal and BJP.  All India 
Trinamool Congress of Mamata Banerjee is as unpredictable as she was with 
BJP.  The major factor that in each of these is retention as well as creation of 
(new or lost) political turf.  Obviously, issues of cohabitation as well as 
political turf wars would continue to dominate Indian politics as well as 
electoral politics in the country for some time to come.  
This, however, may not lead to greater institutionalisation and 
democratisation of the regional parties.  The fact that all regional parties are 
family based is not particularly healthy for Indian democracy.  And, Shiv 
Sena as well as its variant MNS remain anathema to democracy.  That 
national parties still relate to them is an issue of concern. 
 
 
BY WAY OF A CONCLUSION 
 
The foregoing discussion brings out that elections in India have witnessed a 
course change since the ninth general election in 1989.  The changes have 
come about due to a combined impact of transformations in the electoral 
patterns, what the CSDS-Lokniti analysis has described as India’s third 
electoral system (Yadav 1999), as well as profound changes in the party 
system since the breakdown of the one-party-dominant system with the 
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decline of the Congress (Mehra, Khanna and Kueck 2003).  Despite electoral 
volatility during the 1990s that witnessed five general elections and eight 
governments in a decade, stability in electoral and governmental domains 
returned by 1999 despite cohabitation problems amongst coalition partners.  
This stability has been confirmed by both 2004 and 2009 general elections. 
However, despite this stability, representative government in India is 
struggling with a range of issues that have been ingrained in India’s 
procedural democracy.  A day before the Indian constitution was enacted Dr. 
B.R. Ambedkar, chairman of the drafting committee, in a long meaningful 
speech made a distinction between social and political democracy and a gap 
between the two that needed to be bridged in the country.25  The 
contradiction between political democracy on the one hand and social and 
economic democracy on the other, has not been bridged in six decades of 
independence and electoral politics.  In fact, this contradiction over the years 
in India has emerged as the one between procedural democracy and 
substantive democracy. 
 
Nearly two decades of economic liberalization may have reduced 
unemployment, pulled down the poverty line, but this ‘shining India’ has its 
darker side too.  Nearly 21.1 percent of the entire rural population and 15 
percent of the urban population of India exists in this difficult physical and 
financial predicament according to the latest World Bank report.  India ranks 
49th in the Global Hunger Index.  More than 27 percent of the world’s 
undernourished population lives in India while 43 percent of children under 
five years in the country are underweight – much higher than sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The division of resources, as well as wealth, is very uneven in India 
(40 percent of growth goes to the pocket of 1 percent) – this disparity creates 
different poverty ratios for different states.26  A latest UNDP supported 
report by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative that 
developed and applied the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) has 
pointed out that eight Indian states together account for more poor people 
than 26 poorest African nations combined.27  Farmer’s suicide in different 
                                                 
25 ‘On the 26th of January 1950, we are going to enter into a life of contradictions.  In 
politics we will have equality and in social and economic life we will have inequality. 
[…]  We must remove this contradiction at the earliest moment, or else those who 
suffer from inequality will blow up the structure of political democracy which this 
Assembly has so laboriously built up.’ 
B.R. Ambedkar on 25 November 1949, Constituent Assembly Debates, New Delhi: 
Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1989, vol. IX, p. 979. 
26 Quoting a survey by Centre for Media Studies which reported that about 37 
percent of people below the poverty line and about 22 percent of people belonging 
to the general category are bribed to cast their votes, Balmuli Natrajan concludes 
that ‘One cannot question electoral politics without appearing undemocratic.  
Eelectoral politics has a way of delimiting what democracy means.  So, other forms 
of democracy (deliberative or proportional representation or even electoral reforms) 
are placed in the “insane” box too easily.  And yet we need to take such a risk every 
time Indian elections arrive, not least because we learn about our freedom by seeing 
what is inside its prison, and learn about our sanity by seeing who is inside its 
asylum’. Natrajan (2009:14-17). 
27 This new MPI supplants the Human Poverty Index.  It assesses a range of 
‘deprivations’ at the household level from education to health outcomes to assets 
and services create the poverty index.  As per this assessment there were 421 million 
poor in Bihar, Chhatisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh and West Bengal as compared to 410 million in 26 countries in Africa. This 
report also claims that 55 percent of India’s population is poor, of course on the 
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parts of the country for a decade has led to around 100,000 deaths.  About 
320 million Indians go to bed without food every night, an alarming situation 
that is getting worse and there are still starvation deaths.28  Dalits still suffer 
both social and economic exclusion and violence against them has not 
ceased.  Adivasis in large parts of the country are another section of the 
population who continue to suffer from socio-economic deprivation and the 
upsurge and sustenance of Maoism in the ‘red corridor’ has been attributed 
to the persisting development deficit (See Mehra 2009a and 2010b).  The 
Sachar Committee Report brought out stark economic backwardness of the 
Muslims, who appeared to have been pushed against the wall socially and 
politically since the rise of the politics of Hindutva (India 2006).  The 
political economy of liberalization and globalization has created 
development dichotomies that are spilling into violent protests (Mehra 
2008a). 
 
Still one cannot miss four significant points regarding India’s sixty two 
years old democratic process.  First, not only has the country held fifteen 
successful general elections, it has held several state elections too, which got 
effectively delinked from the national elections in 1971 when Indira Gandhi 
called for a mid-term poll.  Second, nationally there have not only been 
fourteen successions to the country’s leadership, there have been eleven 
transfers of power at the Raisina Hill, the seat of country’s political power.  
Of course, this does not include several successions and transfers of power in 
the states.  Third, the Constitution may have been amended 94 times in 50 
years, a fact that some commentators use to point out its imperfections, it 
continues to be the bedrock on which Indian democratic institutions and 
processes have thrived.  Fourth, there have also been democratic slip ups 
both at the national and state levels, which expose the soft underbelly of 
Indian democracy.29  
 
As India completed the process to elect fifteenth Lok Sabha in an 
election that was perceived to be issueless and an aggregation of several 
regional, state and local elections, the results have surprising bylines of 
certain national messages: i) stability; ii) the continuing space for national 
parties with a developmental agenda; iii) despite the emotional appeal of 
ethnic mobilization, programmatic mobilization too tends to succeed; iv) 
                                                                                                                   
basis of the indices this study team has developed and used.  The report found that 
more than 40 percent of the population even in prosperous states such as Gujarat, 
Haryana and Karnataka were poor. See The Times of India, 13 July 2010, p.1 and 
The Times of India, 15 July 2010, p. 11. 
28 Speaking on Hunger in India at a public hearing on the Right to Food Amartya 
Sen said in New Delhi on 10 January 2003, ‘When India achieved independence, 
more than 50 years ago, the people of the country were much afflicted by endemic 
hunger.  They still are. Since India is often considered to be one of the great success 
stories in tackling the food problem, the belief in success has to be scrutinized in the 
light of the grim reality that we can observe.’ See 
http://www.righttofoodindia.org/data/amartya.pdf. 
29 We are referring here to the national emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi 
between June 1975 and March 1977.  If that has been referred to as the biggest 
democratic slip up, there have been several ‘not-so-major’ ones relating to the 
misuse of the office of Governor, continuing lack of democracy in parties and so on.  
Indeed, many of these have been, and perhaps should be, described as the process of 
maturing of Indian democracy, the frequency must come down as the country 
assumes democratic adulthood. 
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appreciation of good governance, even by state/regional parties and leaders, 
over caste, religion and ethnicity based politics.30  The emergence of the 
Congress as the single largest party with 206 seats is not only a surprising 
national revival, its reemergence as a political force in the largest state Uttar 
Pradesh with 22 seats, getting second position after the SP (23)31 and pipping 
the BSP 21 to the third position, has exposed limitations of the caste based 
politics and ‘innovative’ sarvajan mobilisation in 2007 by Mayawati that 
fancied her prime ministerial dream.32 
 
This raises three significant questions regarding Indian democracy – a 
general one and a specific one relating to the current elections.  First, why is 
it that despite heavy odds, poverty and deprivation, electoral participation in 
the general elections, including in the current one, has sustained at 50 
percent plus level for over a decade?  Second, why during the 2009 Lok 
Sabha elections people opted for the Congress-led United Progressive 
Alliance despite questions on the Congress’s capacity to carry along allies, 
its alleged arrogance as the senior partner, and its weaknesses on governance 
front too?  Third, even though the Congress along with its UPA coalition 
partners, some of which (such as NCP, AITC) are its fragments, has got the 
mandate to govern the country for five more years, implication of this 
victory for various questions related to Indian democracy must be considered 
with introspection and caution. 
 
The answers to the questions are related.  First, we would stress what 
we mentioned earlier, i.e., politics of India for the past one decade has been 
characterized as ‘the upsurge from below’ (Mehra 2004:62-71), a process 
that has also been characterized as the emergence of the third electoral 
system, which also ‘represents a relative expansion of democratic choice for 
the voters as well as their efficacy’ (Yadav 1999:2393-2399).  In other 
words, that the poor and the disadvantaged have found the electoral system 
in India to be a useful system and an effective instrument through which they 
can express themselves and make political choices, change governments and 
regimes and even compel political agenda should be accepted as success of 
the electoral system as well as democracy in India.  This works on the other 
side too, i.e., political parties and governments at the Centre and in states 
have compulsions to mobilise people.  The emerging political choices for the 
people works despite ‘sudden outburst of some of the maladies inherent in 
our system: the endemic multiplication in the number of political parties and 
                                                 
30 This is starkly visible in Narendra Modi’s Gujarat.  His good governance and 
development plans completely overshadow his rabid communalism.  During the last 
Legislative Assembly election campaign he cleverly appealed to both the 
constituencies, making his communalism more dangerous.  
31 The situation has changed after 7 November 2009 by-election in which Firozabad 
Lok Sabha seat was won by Congress candidate Raj Babbar, who defeated Mulayam 
Singh Yadav’s daughter-in-law Dimple Yadav by 85,043 votes.  Firozabad was one 
of the two seats (Kannauj was the other) that Yadav’s son Akhilesh Yadav had won 
in the general election.  He vacated Firozabad and his wife contested from there and 
lost.  The Hindu, November 11, 2009.  This brings SP’s tally in the Lok Sabha down 
to 22, making the Congress with 23 MPs as the largest group from politically 
significant Uttar Pradesh. 
32 For a comprehensive and perceptive analysis of the BSP’s shift from bahujan 
(signifying assertion of the majority dalits and oppressed) to sarvajan (inclusive 
politics combining the dalits and oppressed with the higher castes under a dalit 
leadership) in its rhetoric as well as political strategy (see Pai 2008). 
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the fractionalization of the political space; the rise of regional parties and 
caste-community based parties that threaten to unleash fissiparous 
tendencies and a clash of primordial loyalties; end of ideology-based politics 
and the decline of political morality; and, of course, excessive political 
corruption, non-governance, disorder and instability.’ (Yadav 1999: 2393). 
 
The answer to the second and third questions is embedded in the 
analysis of the electoral data of the 2009 elections undertaken above.  Unlike 
in 2004, 2009 results cannot be explained in terms of national nodal parties 
doing better, but regional allies not doing well enough.  The answer to this 
question is inherent in a number of variables.  First, the impact of various 
schemes focusing on the poor, if not good governance, would have to be 
factored in, which perhaps made dents amongst the dalits and tribals too.33  
The Sachar Committee report on Muslim backwardness and the UPA 
government’s stated resolve to bring in ameliorative schemes appears to 
have made the Muslims drift back to the Congress, softening disenchantment 
since the Ayodhya demolition.  The Congress for now appears to be amongst 
the better options for them.  The BJP’s politics of securitization in the wake 
of terror attacks in which Muslims were seen as the villains of the piece too 
perhaps made the Congress a safer option. 
 
Second, the nature, organisation, politics, programmes, leadership and 
political campaign of the main rival the BJP.  One of the main questions to 
be considered is whether 2009 elections, as the 2004 elections, has exposed 
limits to the BJP’s politics of Hindutva.  It must be admitted that despite 
asserting secularity of the Hindutva ideology, equating terrorism with Islam 
leading to stereotyping and continuing ‘otherisation’ of the Indian Muslims, 
violence against the Christians in Kandhmal (Orissa) and violent moral 
policing by its sister organisations, which the party tended to defend, could 
have brought in a subterranean negative political atmosphere for the party.  
Of course fissures within the BJP and the NDA would account for some of 
the limitations that the party and the formation faced.  BJP’s 18.80 percent 
votes could be interpreted both ways. 
 
Third, the state/regional parties, both in terms of their vote share (36.42 
percent) over the years and their utility for the national parties appear to be 
plateauing at one-third level.34  With the Congress emerging more confident 
after the fifteenth general elections and attempting to carry over the political 
thrust to win over lost constituencies across the country and society under 
personal care of Rahul Gandhi, regional parties appear apprehensive despite 
their compulsion to coalesce for a share in the national power pie. 
 
                                                 
33 The disaggregated results from various states confirm the importance of 
governance variable.  Bihar, for example, for a long associated with complete 
absence of governance, has voted for good governance given to the state by Nitish 
Kumar-led NDA government, wiping out satraps like Lalu Yadav, who held sway in 
Bihar for a decade and a half, and Ram Vilas Paswan.  Same it true of Orissa, where 
Naveen Patnaik has been given another term.  The BJP ruled Madhya Pradesh and 
Chhatisgarh could not be penetrated by the UPA.  In Gujarat too the BJP held fort, 
though the Congress did snatch away a few seats.  If Andhra Pradesh expressed faith 
in Y. Rajashekhara Reddy’s Congress administration, Mayawati’s citadel was 
shaken in UP within two years of her sarvajan card.  Kerala voted against the LDF’s 
wrangling and misrule.  
34 Mehra and Sharma (2008).  Also see Mehra (2009b). 
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Fourth, the questions of democratisation of political parties and party 
building – organisation, political recruitment, political leadership – in the 
context of emerging political and electoral uncertainties as well as 
institutionalisation of the parties and party system in the world’s largest 
democracy, also deserve examination.  The party system in India since the 
ninth general elections in 1989 has been reconfiguring itself on several 
parameters – the end of the one-party-dominant-system, institutionalisation 
of coalition politics at the national level, the emergence of the BJP as the 
main rival to the Congress, the emergence of smaller state or regional parties 
with national stakes, the emergence of dalit politics and parties independent 
of national parties, federalisation of the party systems, and so on.35  Two 
decades and six general elections, three of which were mid-term elections, 
later the party system deserves a relook on several counts.  It is third general 
elections in succession when the ruling coalition looks stable, a new-look 
Congress is over confident, the BJP and its politics of Hindutva are on 
crossroads, the Left is considerably weakened and in disarray and regional 
parties do not seem to have the same bargaining position as in 1996, 1998, 
1999 and 2004. 
 
Indian democracy, and election as an instrument of its participatory and 
representative forms, has attracted interests of the social science community 
from the outset.36  It has been perceived as democratic expression of the 
people of the country, as their judgment on the performance of the 
government, as an instrument of developing new political alignments, 
generating new political attitudes and over a period reorganizing the 
country’s political society.37  As we review the outcome and impact of the 
fifteenth general elections on Indian polity and society, the support building 
and system maintenance functions of elections and other functions under 
these two rubrics – legitimacy, political stability, integration, identification, 
assimilation, involvement, commitment, allegiance-maintaining and 
allegiance re-affirming, and mobilization – that Norman Palmer (1976:82) 
underlined, deserve review. 
 
The post-independence Indian polity developed since the enactment of 
the constitution in 1950 that took a radical step in granting universal adult 
suffrage in a poor and largely illiterate country38 and beginning of the 
electoral process in 1952, which has been going on smoothly, except a brief 
interregnum of eighteen months (June 1975-March 1977), ensuring transfer 
of power both at the national and state levels.  Given the apprehensions 
about the efficacy of the post-colonial Asian and African societies to 
transform themselves into modern states, this has been no mean 
achievement.  No wonder, despite several socio-economic limitations and 
development of certain processes and trends (such as corruption, 
                                                 
35 See the collection of essays in its entirety in Mehra, Khanna and Kueck (2003). 
36 Seymour Martin Lipset has underlined voting as ‘the key mechanism of consensus 
in democratic society.’  He considered consensus that emerges through the process 
of elections as a fundamental value in social system, which should be focused in 
social science analysis more than cleavage (Lipset, 1963:12).  
37 Gopal Krishna quoted by Palmer (1976:11).  
38 Not surprisingly there were apprehensions amongst the western scholars who 
either predicted Balkanisation of India in the wake of inevitable disharmony and 
communal conflict, or foresaw structural incongruities and discontinuity due to 
immense popular mobilisation. 
See Harrison (1960) and Huntington (1968). 
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criminalisation of politics, social and political conflict, sharpening of 
identities and parochialism, undermining and weakening of institutions) that 
could be termed negative (we shall discuss them later), elections have not 
only sustained India’s representative democracy, they have also contributed 
to the construction of citizenship beyond caste and creed.39  Earlier, in a 
perceptive study of Democracy and Social Change in India, Subrata K. 
Mitra and V. B. Singh stressed the construction and growth of citizenship in 
India through electoral competition and democratic processes set in motion 
by it.  So much so that ‘… there is hardly any section of the Indian 
population which remains entirely untouched by the process of 
democratisation.’  Yet, the same study also underlines ‘(t)he impact of social 
disadvantages on participation and levels of personal efficacy…’ making 
‘…certain groups, basically from the disadvantaged sections of society…less 
informed or insufficiently motivated’.  Not surprisingly, the study puts the 
role of political parties too under scanner for this democratic deficit.  Mitra 
and Singh appropriately articulate chinks in India’s democratic fortress in 
the last decade of twentieth century and as it transitions to a new millennium 
(Mitra and Singh 1999:65-66, 116, 253): 
 
Freewheeling politicians, venality, freebooting civil servants 
and ministers, ethnic conflict and violence, political 
fragmentation, are the order of the day.  In the place of the 
sacrifice that characterised the generation of Gandhi and 
Nehru, we have short-term calculations of personal and narrow 
sectarian interests of the most blatant kind.  Whereas the early 
years after independence were marked by great governmental 
stability, minority regimes and unstable coalitions now appear 
to be the rule.  In the place of the dignified and good party men 
running the regions – a Gobind Ballabh Pant here and a 
Kamraj Nadar there – we had the tainted figures of politicians 
of all ideological hues. 
 
Obviously, these and several other related issues such as corruption, 
crimialisation of politics, gender representations, greater institutionalisation 
of processes and institutions of democracy (including the political parties), 
emergence of a more institutionalised power sharing arrangement and 
greater cohabitation amongst the coalition partners at different levels are 
critical to greater democratisation of the Indian society and polity and 
elections would definitely play a greater role in the process. 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Christophe Jaffrelot has underlined percolation of fruits of political democracy in 
India first while analyzing the rise of the low castes in north Indian politics and 
recently in a co-edited volume on a similar rise in state politics.  See Jaffrelot (2003) 
and Jaffrelot and Kumar (2009). 
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